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If the real exchange rate follows approximately a random walk and in the presence of nontraded 
goods, a monetary union may generate a Pareto improvement. The argument is based on the 
analogy with the advantages that derive from the formation of a customs union. A novel unit 
roots test based on the arc sine law is advanced. 
1. Introduction 
Several arguments have been advanced in favor of the formation of a 
monetary union. These arguments rely on criteria such as sufftcient factor 
mobility (Mundell), a high share of tradables (McKinnon), product diversifi- 
cation (Kenen), financial integration (Ingram), and similarity of inflation 
rates (Fleming), which are considered conditiones sine quibus non for 
reaping the benefits from monetary integration. The benefits supposedly 
derive from the returns to scale using the same currency and reduced 
international commodity price uncertainty. As for the costs of unification, the 
loss of autonomy over setting the inflation rate and collecting the seignorage 
is often mentioned. For a detailed review of the issues concerning monetary 
unions the interested reader is referred to Ishiyama (1975) and Allen and 
Kenen (1980). 
Here we like to draw attention to a novel argument in favor of a monetary 
union in the sense of a single currency area. It is based on the customs union 
argument in combination with the empirical regularity that real exchange 
rates follow approximately a random walk. Even though research has not 
been able to turn up significant (negative) effects of short term exchange rate 
volatility on trade [cf. Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978), Gotur (1985) and 
Bailey et al. (1986)], it is widely recognized that the long term swings in, for 
*We are grateful to Steven Brakman, Harris Dellas, Giancarlo Gandolfo, Kees Koedijk, Bert 
Schohens and Jerome Stein for their highly insightful comments, and to Edith Siermann for her 
computational assistance. 
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instance, the dollar-mark rate over the past two decades have exerted a 
substantial influence on the volume of trade. Short-term volatility effects are 
mitigated by the presence of forward markets [cf. Ethier (1973)]. Long-term 
movements in one direction or the other, however, cannot be hedged and 
therefore exert an influence which is comparable to a temporary change in 
the terms of trade. This is the analogue of the distorting price effect caused 
by a tariff. For example, Frenkel and Razin (1989) recently argued that 
pegged exchange rates are equivalent to a lump sum tax cum subsidy policy. 
In a world with trade distortions, there exists a well known argument [see 
Kemp and Wan (1976), Dixit and Norman (1986)], whereby a subset of 
countries may form a customs union that constitutes a Pareto improvement. 
In this paper we intend to make this line of argument precise for the 
potential advantages that derive from the formation of a monetary union if 
the real exchange rate approximately follows a random walk. The near 
random walk feature is tested for in a novel way on the basis of the arc sine 
law. The new test is insightful as it directly reveals how a random walk in 
exchange rates distorts relative prices. 
2. Monetary union 
In this section the analogy between exchange rate and tariff distortions is 
studied. To this end we consider two economies, one with a monetary 
distortion, the other with a pure trade distortion. 
2.1. Nontraded goods and the exchange rate 
Suppose preferences are of the CobbDouglas type. Let there be n + 1 
goods, nz 1 of which are traded and of which the first good, that is indexed 
by h, is nontraded. The budget shares of the traded goods are /Ii, i = 1,2,. . ., n, 
0 <pi < 1, and 1 Bi< 1. The nontraded good’s budget share is fl,, = 1 -C Bi. 
Prices of the traded goods are Pi and the price of the nontraded good is P,. 
The true cost of living index P with Cobb-Douglas preferences is [see 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p. 178)] 
p=pgh fi pai, 
i=l 
where the right-hand side of eq. (1) has been set equal to 1 in the base 
period. 
A similar relation holds for the foreign country. For the traded goods we 
have, by the law of one price, P,*= WPiy that is, zero transport costs, etc., 
where W is the bilateral exchange rate (in units of foreign currency per unit 
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of domestic currency), and the superscript * refers to the foreign country’s 
variables. Hence, the foreign country’s price index P* reads 
P* =(P@bh fj (WPJ@’ = WP(PyWP,)h 
i=l 
(2) 
For the base period it is assumed that Pz= WP,, which implies purchasing 
power parity (PPP) and P* = WP. Upon taking logarithms of the above 
equation and using lower case letters to denote variables that are trans- 
formed into logarithms, we get 
(3) 
where z = pt- p,,- w. Note that either z=O or /Ii,=0 implies PPP for the 
current period. Also note that /&,=z =0 implies relative PPP, not necessarily 
absolute PPP [cf. Levich (1985, p. 984 and p. 1003)]. Absolute PPP is 
obtained when our assumptions about the base period are correct. While the 
above describes the demand side of the economy, it can be easily integrated 
in a full scale mode1 of the economy with a supply side as well. For example, 
the Ricardian mode1 of trade may serve this purpose as is evident from the 
exposition in Dornbusch et al. (1977) and Dornbusch (1980, ch. 8). Another 
possibility would be to consider variable factor supplies in combination with 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade mode1 [see Woodland (1982, ch. 8)]. 
In the Ricardian trade mode1 deviations from PPP arise in conjuction with a 
distortion, like nominal wage rigidity which becomes effective once there is a 
disturbance in one of the two money supplies. In response to the money 
supply innovation the exchange rate adjusts to partially restore PPP. The 
adjustment is imperfect due to the presence of nontraded goods. Obviously, 
with a common shock to both money supplies, that is, as in the case of a 
monetary union, PPP is not lost. 
2.2. Traded goods and tarifSs 
Consider the case where all goods are traded, that is, good h is traded as 
well. Suppose that the foreign country imports this commodity h on which it 
levies a specific tariff (T- 1) > 0. To distinguish the commodity prices under 
the current regime from the previous one, they are denoted by Qi. The 
foreign price index becomes 
Q* = WTfl”Qfl” fi Qfi, 
i=l 
(4) 
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which may be rewritten as 
4*-q-_-=/&T, 
where r = log 7: 
When the tariff rate r is changed from zero to a positive number, it follows 
that there will be a deviation from PPP in the current period [cf. Dornbusch 
et al. (1977, p. 831)]. 
2.3. Equivalence 
Note the similarity of eqs. (3) and (5). In case &=O, it is easily seen that 
q=p and q*=p*, so that the two regimes become equivalent. Are there 
conditions under which the two regimes can be considered equivalent when 
&, is positive? Suppose the tariff rate r is stochastic instead of fixed, and 
equal in distribution to z. Let all tax revenues be rebuted to the same agents 
that profit from the movements in w. Moreover, all trade is in commodities, 
so that there are no capital movements. Under these conditions the two 
systems (3) and (5) are equal in distribution and can be considered to be 
equivalent [see also Frenkel and Razin (1989) who argue the same for a fixed 
rate regime]. 
In other words, the deviation from PPP in eq. (5) stems from a stochastic 
trade distortion, the deviation from PPP in eq. (3) derives from nominal 
exchange rate movements. With nontraded goods and stickyness in, say, 
nominal wages such that &, $0 and ~$0, the movements in the nominal 
exchange rate caused by money supply changes impose an implicit tariff. The 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations thereby exert real effects, as they distort 
relative prices. For a transparent exposition op these real effects, see 
Dornbusch (1980, ch. 8). It pays to link this analogy with the stylized facts of 
exchange rates. 
3. The arc sine laws and potential benefits from a monetary union 
Several empirical studies document that real exchange rates follow 
approximately a random walk [see, e.g., Roll (1979), Frenkel (1981), Adler 
and Lehman (1983), Hakkio (1984), Frankel and Meese (1987)]. A similar 
observation holds for nominal exchange rates [see, e.g., Mussa (1979), Meese 
and Rogoff (1983)]. The random walk in nominal rates is almost undisputed, 
but for real rates the evidence is mixed. Huizinga (1987), Frankel and Meese 
(1987) and Koedijk and Schotman (1990), find significant mean reversion in 
real rates. These latter results are partly due to using more powerful tests, or 
derive from using longer samples. For example, Frankel and Meese (1987, 
pp. 124-125) cannot reject the random walk hypothesis on the basis of 
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Dickey-Fuller t-statistics for data over the past decade, but do reject the 
hypothesis when using data over the past 116 years. In light of this evidence, 
the real rate is close to a random walk, but it may not have an 
autoregressive coefficient exactly equal to one. For practical purposes, such 
as modeling real-rate behavior over the medium term, however, the random 
walk in real rates may be a suitable working hypothesis. Consider, for 
example, the following stationary process: 
y(t)=ly(t-l)+&(t). 
Here E(t) are i.i.d. innovations and A= 1 with probability p=O.99 and 
0<1< 1 with p=O.Ol. It is easily demonstrated that 90% of the histories are 
indistinguishable from a random walk for the time span t = 1,2,. . ., 10. In fact 
this is all we need to carry through our arguments. We chose to focus on the 
pure random walk process to expedite the presentation. Campbell and 
Clarida (1987), for example, also follow this methodology. 
Suppose, then, that the real rate I follows a. symmetric random walk, 
where r=p* -p- w. Note, inter alia, that this implies that p* -p and w 
cannot be cointegrated, given the observed random walk nature in the 
nominal rate w. At the same time, however, eq. (3) imposes that r and z are 
cointegrated. A sufficient condition for I to follow a random walk is for 
instance that pt- p,,=O and that the nominal rate w follows a random walk. 
Formally, the stochastic process {tit)} is defined as 
r(t) =r(t- l)+&(t), 
r(O) = 0, (6) 
s(t) =r(t)-r(O)= i c(i), 
i=l 
where the zero boundary value indicates PPP at time zero, and c(t) are i.i.d. 
mean zero symmetric innovations. As is well known, 0 is a persistent state 
[see Feller (1970a, ch. XIV.7), Feller (1970b)l. Thus, with probability one 
r(t) =s(t) =O for some future t. This amounts to an infinitely often recurrence 
to the PPP state. Being as it may be, deviations from PPP over prolonged 
periods of time are well documented [see, e.g., Isard (1977, p. 942), 
McKinnon (1979, p. 133), Levich (1985, pp. 1005-1006), Dornbusch (1986)]. 
It has puzzled many authors that short term deviations from PPP can be so 
large and persistent, even though long term PPP seems to hold [cf. Levich 
(1985, p. 989) and McKinnon (1979, p. 136)]. For this reason, according to 
Levich (1985, p. 1006), research has turned away from PPP to focus on 
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Percentage x of 
time that s(t)>0 
Table 1 
Discrete arc sine distribution.’ 
x= 0 x=10 x=20 x=30 x=40 
x=100 x=90 x=80 x=70 x=60 x=50 
Probability L(x) 0.1762 0.0927 0.0736 0.0655 0.0617 0.0606 
‘Source: Feller (1970a). 
explanatory models for these deviations. As it appears, however, these 
observations are exactly in line with the nature of the random walk in eqs. 
(6). It corresponds with predictions of the famous arc sine law [see Feller 
(1970a, ch. 111.4, th. 2), Feller (1970b, ch. X11.8)]. 
Theorem 1 (Feller). Let E(t) and r(t) be as defined under (6). The probability 
L that r(t)>0 for x% of a discrete number of periods k, equals L.(x) =(kn)-’ 
(x( 1 -x))-~‘~. The distribution function of this density is 27r- ’ arc sin fi. 
The remarkable feature of this theorem is that the probability of sojourn 
times is U-shaped.’ Table 1 adapted from Feller (1970a, p. 79) provides an 
example for k= 10. The table indicates the low likelihood, that is, 0.0606, of 
r(t) being positive 50% of the time vis-A-vis the higher likelihood of r(t) being 
positive (negative) for more than 50% of the time. The same distribution 
holds for the probability of the last time PPP occurred. Thus, it is far more 
likely that PPP occurred just recently or a long time ago, than that it lastly 
happened at half time.’ This explains why deviations from PPP are so 
persistent, because the real exchange rate is more likely to be overvalued or 
undervalued for a prolonged period of time than that it flip flops around the 
PPP value. 
In order to scrutinize the empirical validity of the arc sine law, we 
constructed table 2 from the real exchange rates for 16 countries vis-A-vis the 
United States and Germany. For each bilateral rate 16 histories of eleven 
consecutive observations were formed from the total of 176 available 
monthly observations. For each history the first observtion was set apart and 
used as a reference point. We then simply counted how many times the other 
10 observations exceeded the reference poinL3 The frequency of these 
positive deviations is reported in table 2 as a fraction of the total number 
‘Theorem 1 also holds for certain continuous time random walks such as the Brownian 
motion. 
‘The U-shaped density imposes a nonlinearity upon the distribution function. It implies that 
the probability that for x% of the time or less r(t)>0 is concave-convex in x (cf. the second part 
of Theorem 1 from which its name is derived). 
3For each exchange-rate series we tested for symmetry as the arc sine law only applies to a 
symmetric random walk. On basis of the tests the Danish krone/German mark rate was 
excluded from the computations in table 2. 
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Table 2 
Frequency of the percentage of positive deviations from PPP. 
Percentage x
of time that x 
s(t)>0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Relative frequency 
- Against US dollar 0.27 -0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 
- Against German mark 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.20 
‘The table is constructed from monthly bilateral real exchange rate series for 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
the United States over the period January 1973 to August 1987. The real rates are 
derived from the end of the month spot rates and the respective wholesale price 
indexes, all reported in the International Financial Statistics published by the 
International Monetary Fund. Real rates are computed as in McKinnon (1979, eq. 
6.12). 
from the 256 and 240 histories for the dollar and mark rates, respectively. 
The U-shapedness is clearly present, though there is some asymmetry 
between the dollar and the mark rates. The near U-shapedness is confirmed 
by the chi-squared goodness of fit statistics x2(10) which are 25.6 and 8.8 for 
the real rates against the U.S. dollar and German mark, respectively. There 
are alternative tests against unit roots [see, e.g., Fuller (1976) and Cochrane 
(1988)]. To the best of our knowledge the current test is novel to the 
economics literature and is insightful as it directly reveals the persistence of 
the deviations from PPP. 
Given the theoretical result which matches reasonably well with the 
empirical observations, there is a simple argument for the advantages derived 
from a monetary union. Above we established stochastic equivalence between 
eqs. (3) and (5). Therefore, the discussion may as well be cast in terms of a 
variable tariff r(t). Formally, suppose that r(t) follows a random walk such 
that 7(t) satisfies (6). By theorem 1 this produces one way deviations from 
PPP for prolonged periods of time. Because every position 7 attained by 7(t) 
can be considered as the origin of a new random walk with all the properties 
of the previous one, it is equally true that 7(t) > 7 for prolonged periods of 
time,4 where r is a fixed positive number, say. Now invoke Kemp and Wan’s 
(1976) theorem on customs unions. 
Theorem 2 (KempWan). Consider any competitive world trading equilibrium 
with nonzero tar@? 7. Let any subset of the countries form a customs union. 
Then there exists a common tarifl vector and a system of lump-sum compen- 
41n fact, the expected waiting time for the event r(t)<? is infinite [see Feller (197Ob. p. 395)]. 
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sations, involving only members of the union, such that there is an associated 
tar@ridden competitive equilibrium in which each individual is not worse of15 
Kemp and Wan’s result relates to fixed tariff rates T. With a symmetric 
random walk in tariff rates the argument applies as well, since E[$t+ n)] = 7 
for all positive n when at time t: r(t) =7, and assuming risk neutrality (see 
also footnote 4). Given the equivalence between eqs. (3) and (5), we obtain 
the following proposition. 
Proposition I. When the real exchange rates follow a symmetric random walk, 
any subset of countries may benefit and nobody lose if those countries form a 
monetary union by instituting a single currency, revalue their common currency 
against the other currencies appropriately such that the trade with the rest of 
the world is as before, and compensate internally by lump-sum transfers.6 
Proposition 1 applies to any subset of countries, but it is of interest to 
note that most monetary unions, like the EMS, involve multilateral agree- 
ments instead of bilateral, such as the monetary union between Belgium and 
Luxembourg. This has an empirical and theoretical basis. To evaluate the 
gains from bilateral versus multilateral agreements, compare the time series 
for a number of real bilateral exchange rates. For example, with the 
appropriate interpretation, the figure for several real effective exchange rates 
in Levich (1985) may be used. For convenience, this figure is reproduced as 
fig. 1. From such series it is immediate that while some rates do return to 
specific values, like the initial (PPP?) value, it is a coincidence when two 
rates return to this value simultaneously; while a simultaneous return of all 
rates is such a rare event that it is not observed in the samples. Thus 
multilateral PPP is much less likely to occur than bilateral PPP. In fact, the 
following theoretical result applies [see Feller (1970a, p. 360)]. 
Theorem 3 (Polya). There is probability one that a single or two independent 
discrete random walks simultaneously return to their initial positions. The 
probability that three or more random walks simultaneously return to their 
initial positions is less than one. 
In a world with at least four different currencies, there are at least three 
independent real exchange rates. Assume that these latter rates all follow 
random walks. In the above we have interpreted long run PPP as the 
sDixit and Norman (1986) have shown that commodity taxes may be used instead of lump 
sum transfers. This scheme may be potentially easier to institute. 
6The following caveat applies. Proposition 1 does not apply if there are other distortions, 
which is the second best problem. To advance possible confusion, note that in Section 2 the 
nominal wages are tixed such that PPP holds initially, i.e., the world is at the Pareto frontier. 
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eventual and certain return to the initial position. In this sense, Theorem 3 
implies that multilateral PPP for more than three countries is improbable, as 
a simultaneous return is uncertain. It is in this sense that the returns from 
multilateral monetary unions exceed the benefits from the sum of bilateral 
unions. 
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